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RIGHTS IN SUBTERRANEAN WATERS.
To one, whose taste-leads him to consider the law in its historical relations, there is scarce one of the numerous topics embraced
in it, which may not afford interesting speculations, as well as
valuable suggestions and reflections.
The science of Comparative Jurisprudence has not received the
attention it deserves. As a department of ethnology, it has not
been assigned' the place which its importance would justify.
There are few more infallible tests of the condition of a people,
their social development and relative advance in refinement and
good morals, than the laws, written or unwritten, by which their
property is held, their rights determined, or their wrongs redressed:
The twelve tables were the brief body of laws of Savage. Rome.
The Code, Pandects, and Institutes of Justinian, were summaries
of the refined and 'complicated system of legal ethics, which had
been developed by the -changes through which that people had
passed, during the life of a thousand years,'as well as of the wants
which had had to be supplidd during that period by the wisdom
and foresight of the lawgiver. Every lawyer of our own day, with
the experience and observation of a score of years, cannot fail to
have remarked the progress which jurisprudence has been silently
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making within a period as brief as that; nor can a man justly lay
claim to eminence as a jurist, -who has contented himself with
studying the dry details of dogmatic rules alone.
These remarks, though general and in some measure commonplace,
have been suggested by a recent examination of some -ofthe leading
cases in the English and our own books, in which is involved the
doctrine of the modern law of easements and servitudes. In no
department of the law has progress been more noticeable than in
this. Principles now well settled and familiar, were controverted,
and, in not a few instances, unheard of within the recollection of
many still at the bar. Nor will our space admit of extending the
illustration of this, beyond a simple class of these questions.
Though the subject of rights of water found within and beneath
one's own soil, and percolating in veins and currents through the
body of the earth, was anticipated and provided for to a considerable extent, by a clause in the Digest which Mr. Justice MAULE
has translated: "If a man dig a well in his own field and thereby drain his neighbor's, he may do so unless he does it maliciously ;" it is not a little remarkable, that the first case in which the
point was discussed and settled in England, so far as we have
been able to discover, was that of Acton vs. Blundell, in the
Exchequer Chamber in 1843. Nor was it in fact settled, until
the case of Ohasemore vs. Bichards was decided in the House of
Lords in 1859. The first of these (reported in 12 M. & W. 325, 354),
presented this state of facts. The plaintiff, and those under whom
he claimed, for the purpose of supplying water for working a
cotton-mill, dug a large well upon his premises, tho' benefit of which
he and they had enjoyed for many years rhon the defendant
sunk a coal-pit in land in his possession, f2 a distance of three-.
quarters of a mile from the mill, and subscquenitly, another pit seveL
hundred and thirty-five yards from the r~aintiff's mill. The effect
of opening these coal-pits was to drz-x ,off the water from this well,
so as seriously to impair the val. of the mill, the ground b4tween
the two being porous and consLr(ng of strata through which thi
water percolated from the well to the pits. There was no charg4
that the defendant had done (his maliciously, or with an inteat to
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injure the plaintiff, or without exercising due and reasonable care.
Both in the argument and decision of the case, reference is made
to the doctrines applicable to surface-currents of water, and liberal
citations are made from the civil law writers. TINDAL, C. J.,
quotes the language of Judge STORY in Tyler vs. Wilkinson,
4 MAis. 401, and concludes "that the case now under discussion
does not fall within the rule which obtains as to surface streams,
nor is it to be governed by analogy therewith." The court held,
that the plaintiff was without remedy for the injury he had
sustained. But it should be remarked, that they carefully avoid
determining what would have been the law, if the plaintiff had
enjoyed the water of his well, uninterruptedly, for more than
twenty years.
The case of Ohasemore vs. Richards, 5 H. & N. 982, was of a
somewhat different character, yet involving many of the same
principles. The plaintiff owned a mill which was operated by a
river, which derived a part of its supply of water from a swampy
piece of land bordering upon it, into which the rain from an
extensive watershed of country flowed and settled, and percolated
through the earth to the stream first mentioned. This state of
things had continued for more than sixty years, when the defendants dug a well within this land which belonged to them, and from
the water that collected therein, supplied the town of C. by means
of pumping the same from this well. The action was for thus
diverting the water which would otherwise have found its way, by
percolation, through the earth to the stream, and thereby depriving
the plaintiff's mill of the benefit thereof. It was first heard, on
error from the Court of Exchequer, in the Exchequer Chamber in
1857, and again upon error, in the House of Lords in 1859. The
case of Broadbent vs. Reamsbotham, involving many of the same
points, had been decided by the Court of Exchequer in 1856,
11 Exch. 692. Opinions were delivered in the House of Lords
by WIGIITMAN, J., Lords CHELMSFORD, CRANWORTH, and WENsLEYDALE, in the latter of which it is remarked, that " their Lordships had now to decide for the first time the question as to the
rights of underground water." He refers with approbation to
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Kent's Commentaries, Angell on Watercourses, and a case from
"1 Rawle's Rep. 27, and quotes also from the Civil Law. In
showing the difficulty of applying the ordinary rules in respect to
running water, to underground currents, one of the judges refers
to a fact stated by Lord BROUGHAM, that the Frenc Artesian
well at the Abattoir de Grenelle, was said to draw part of its
supplies from a distance of forty miles underground, and, as far as
is known, from percolating water. The judgment of the House of
Lords was adverse to the plaintiff, and the law in England seems
now to be settled upon the point.
The question had already arisen and been decided in the
American courts, and their judgment had anticipated that of the
English courts. In Massachusetts it was raised in the case of
Greenleafvs. Francis, 18 Pick. 117, and decided in 1836. This,
we believe, was the earliest American case reported, and grew out
of a diversion of the water from the plaintiff's well, which was
supplied by a living spring into which it had been excavated, by
the defendant's well which he had dug near that of the plaintiff,
cutting off thereby the source of the supply of the latter. The
court held it was not actionable. This was followed by the case
of Dexter vs. Prov. Aq. Co. in 1840, 1 Story 887, where the
plaintiff had enjoyed the waters of a spring in his own land for
watering his cattle and irrigation for more than twenty years, and
the defndants had deprived him of these by digging a well near
by, for the purpose of supplying the city of Providence with water.
Upon the strength of the case of Balston vs. Bensted, I Campb.
463, which will be noticed hereafter, the judge held that the
plaintiff was entitled to an injunction against this divirsion. But
he did not consider or settle what the plaintiff's rights would have
been, independent of what he was assumed to have gained by
prescription.
The Court of Connecticut, in 1850, had occasion to consider the
question in the case of Boath vs. Driscol, 20 Conn. 533, which
was in many respects like that of Greenleafvs. Francis,and was
decided in the same manner, in an able and well considered
opinion by ELLSWORTH, J. In Vermont the same conclusion was
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reached in the case of -atfeld vs. Wilson, 28 Verm. 49, and 82
Verm. 861. Although, in that case, the act complained of was
not the diversion of water from one's spring or well, by drawing
away the same by means of excavations within another's land, but
consisted in the defendant's filling in, upon his own land, hard and
impervious earth, in order to prevent the water flowing through
his land to that of his neighbor, and thereby reaching his spring
or well. And this was held not to be actionable, not being done
with an intent to deprive another of what the one causing it did
not wish to apply to his own use.
In 1855 cases occurred in New York and in Pennsylvania which
engaged the attention of their courts. In the first of these, -Ellis
vs. Duncan, 21 Barb. 230, the injury complained of was the
cutting off the supply of water from a natural spring that rose in
the plaintiff's land by the defendant's working a quarry in his own
land. In the latter, Whteatley vs. Bauglh, 25 Penn. St. 528, the
diversion complained 6f, was that of the waters of a natural spring
which was essential to carry on the plaintiff's business as a tanner.
It was occasioned by the defendant commencing to work a valuable
copper mine within his own premises, at a point more than five
hundred yards from the plaintiff's spring. The question is examined with great ability and thoroughness by LEWIS, C. J., and
the judgments in both cases were in favor of the defendants.
It is not proposed to collect here, the various cases in which this
and similar questions have been raised; and these which have been
mentioned, have been selected partly to show the recency and
chronological order of the decisions, and partly to exhibit the
various phases in which the leading point in the cases presented
itself in applying the principles- upon which the decisions rest.
It should be observed, that the question in these cases has not
turned upon the simple fact that the water, whose diversion was
the subject of complaint, was flowing beneath the surface of the
earth. It is now well settled, that where water has formed for
itself a known and ascertainable course or channel, in which it
flows, it is governed by the same rules as to being obstructed or
diverted, whether flowing beneath or upon the surface of the earth:
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DTudden vs. guardians,&c., I H. & N. 630. So it is well settled,
that this diversion of underground supplies of a well cr a spring,
may not be made by a stranger who is not acting with the right
of a landowner, within the limits where the act occasioning the
diversion is done: Parkervs. Bos. & M R. B., 3 Cush. 107. And
all the cases agree, that even such landowner may not deprive the
adjacent owner of the benefit of such underground water, with an
intent to work him an injury and not in the bondfide use of his
own premises for some proper purpose.
When we come to analyze the grounds upon which the courts
have rested their decisions, in the various cases which have arisen
upon this subject, the discussion will be found to have taken a
pretty wide range. They have drawn hints and rules from analogy
with the law of running streams, and also from the distinction
between these, as obvious incidents of property and elements of
value, and the secret deposits or currents of water within the
earth, whose existence may be unknown or unsuspected till
developed by the art and industry of man. It has, moreover, been
assumed by some in reaching their conclusion, that the water
within the body of earth, over which a man's property extends,
is as much a part of what constitutes it, so far as ownership may
be predicated of it, as the minerals, mar], or other substances
-which compose it and give it value.
It will, probably, be found to rest upon a few simple principles
of legal right. The first of these is the dominion, which every
man has in and over his own lands, limited only by the restriction
,,ut alienum non hudas." Whatever use he can" apply it to, or
whatever use he can make of its materials, he may exercise, if he
do not thereby deprive some other person of a paramount right.
If, for instance, he wishes to work a steam-engine, le may dig a
well to supply the necessary water, or may draw it from a spring
in his own land, and so long as he can derive the necessary
supply from these sources he may lawfully use them. But it is to
be remembered, that his neighbor, in this respect, has as good rights
as he, and in the language of LEwIs, C. J., "the law has never
gone so far as to recognise in one man a right to convert another's
Farm to his own use for the purposes of a filter."
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Besides, there is a policy which -enters into the determination
of this question, which must have operated largely in producing so
uniform a course of decisions. If the right to enjoy a well, for
instance, or a spring, is absolute because once rightfully obtained,
and another may not interfere therewith, even in working his own
premises, without being subjected to an action, the owner of a well
for a cottage or a farm-yard, may forever prevent his neighbor
from excavating within his own soil for coal or minerals, though
of vastly more value to the owner and importance to the public
than the well, which is thereby disturbed, can be to the owner.
By adopting, moreover, a different rule from that which is now
become settled law, inasmuch as no one can ordinarily know
beforehand the course or direction of the vein of water that may,
be struck by excavations beneath the surface, if a mere prior
occupation of an underground current or vein of water, by means
of a well, is to give one an exclusive right to enjoy it, the owner
of such a well might -be able to deter' all other persons for a
greater or less distance. from digging a well or a drain, or working
a mine or a quarry, for fear of infringing upon his rights at the
peril of a lawsuit.
There is an apparent hardship, in some cases, it must be
admitted, growing out of this rule'of law. In some parts of the
country a spring of water upon one's premises is of immense value,
often one of the important sources of value to the premises themselves. It may be appropriated to purposes of art as well as of
doniestic use and comfort. So a man may have obtained for the
convenience of his homestead a valuable well of water at a large
expense, and it must often work. a great and sometimes an irreparable mischief to the owner of such spring or well, if a neighbor,
for his own convenience, may cut off its supply and deprive the
owner of its use. And this consideration has, at times, led
judges to inquire whether and how far priority of occupation and
enjoyment of sources of an" underground supply of water come
within the rule of law as to watercourses flowing upon its surface.
(See Roath vs. D-riscoll.) In respect to the latter the law is bniform
and simple. I cannot turn a stream away from my neighbor's
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mill or meadow, although I may put it to far more profitable uses
than he has hitherto done.
But the question about which there has been the most discussion,
and which can hardly be considered as settled yet, is how far
one may gain a prescriptive right by long enjoyment to the use
of underground water.
The earliest and most leading case in favor of the affirmative, is
that of Balston vs. Bensted, 1 Campb. 467, which has already
been mentioned. In that Lord ELLENB3ROUGH assumed that there
could be no doubt, that after enjoying a spring in one's land for
twenty years, any one who should by digging in his own land,
draw down the head of the spring, so as not to be of use to the
owner, would be liable therefor. Such "exclusive enjoyment of
water in any particular manner, affords a conclusive presumption
of right in the party so enjoying it."
Judge STORY, in the case already cited, adopted and acted
upon. this as a settled principle of law. The court of Massachusetts in Greenleafvs. Francis, enter somewhat into the discussion
of this question. But it was not called for, as the well in that
case, had been in existence only for twelve or fourteen years.
The doctrine of Balston vs. Bensted, was directly impugned by
CRESSWELL, J., in Chasemore vs. Richards, who also refers to
Dickenson vs. Grand J. Canal Co., 7 Exch. 282, as sustaining the
same view as his own. And WIGHTMAN, J., in the case of Chasemore vs. Richards, above cited, says that the opinion of Lord
ELLENBOROUGH "amounted only to the dictum of an eminent
judge, followed by no decision of the case, angl is directly at
variance with the judgment of the Court of Exchequer in the case
of .Dickenson vs. Grand J. Canal Co."
Though the point is purposely waived in some of the American
cases, and that of Smith vs. Adams, 6 Paige 435, may seem to
favor the views of Lord ELLENBOROUGH in -Roathvs. Driscoll,above
cited, the court of Connecticut affirm, that "nothing is gained by
a mere continued preoccupancy of water under the surface." The
court of Pennsylvania is equally positive in the case of Wheatley
vs. Baugh ;-" No man by the mere prior enjoyment of the
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advantages of his own land, can establish a servitude upon the
land of another ;" and they deny that any length of enjoyment
of a natural spring of water upon one's land, gives the owner any
prescriptive right to continue it against a disturbance by another
adjoining owner, in the proper prosecution of his business upon
his own premises.
In Chasemore vs. Richards, COLERIDGE, J., in a dissenting
opinion, was inclined to the notion that a mill-owner might, by
long enjoyment of water percolating through the earth, acquire a
prescriptive right thereto, while GOULD, J., in Ingraham vs.
Hutclinson, 2 Conn. 597, impugns the doctrine of Balston vs.
Bensted, as not being well founded or tenable.
In this state of the. law, it may not be impertinent to examine
briefly the principles upon which prescriptions rest, so far as they
apply to cases like that under consideration. We are encouraged
to do this, from a conviction that such an examination will lead to
the same conclusion to which the later cases in England and our
own courts obviously tend.
Regarded as a right, jure naturce, as incident to the ownership
of the property, this does not depend upon length of enjoyment.
My right to the unobstructed, undiverted flow of water in a
natural stream running through my land, is as complete the first
hour of my ownership, as it will be after fifty years' enjoyment,
because it is an incident, jure naturce, to the property in the land.
Prescription, therefore, is something other than and distinct
from what is naturally and necessarily an incident of property in
lands. As applied to easements and servitudes, it implies something
diecessary or added to the natural rights of such property. And
this can only be acquired by grant, wherein one gains something
with which another parts. Prescription always implies a grant;
and long enjoyment of what is claimed, if hid under.. certain
circumstances consistent with such a prescription, is de~med by
law, to be evidence of such a grant having been made. Under
the ancient notion of prescription, this enjoyment must have
been continued so long that no one could negative its having
originated in right. In modern times, the courts have adopted
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the analogy of limitation of titles to land, and hold an enjoyment
under the circumstances alluded to, continued for the length of
time prescribed by local statute as the period of limitation, to be
presunptive evidence of a grant having been made, and they do
not require the party relying upon it to produce his deed, assuming as a presumption of law, if it is not produced, that it has
been lost.
One of the circumstances requisite to raise a presumption of such
a grant from mere enjoyment of what is thus claimed, is that it
should be adverse to and so exercised, as to be known by the
party against whom it is to prevail. ,,
1'ec clam nec precario," as
well as that the acts done should be with an intent thereby to
claim a right, are admitted by all writers to be among the requisites of establishing a prescription.
These principles are too elementary to justify the citation of
authorities to sustain them. And yet it seems only necessary to
apply some of the most familiar of them, in guiding us to a satisfactory solution of the question how far one can acquire a prescriptive right to the enjoyment of underground waters, against the
acts of an adjacent landowner done within the limits of his own
estate.
In the first place, in digging a well or drawing water from a
spring within one's own land, he does no more than exercise a
clear legal right. If his is the only spring or well in the neighborhood, he enjoys it to the injury or disturbance of no other
person's right. Nor can this be in any sense, adverse to the right
of any one. Ordinarily, it would be difficult or impossible to
know from what direction the water is passing to reach his spring
or his well, so that, if there be several adjoining owners, he cannot
know against which of these he is acquiring an adverse right by
enjoyment. And if it can be supposed that he knows, and intends
to draw the water from the land of an adjacent owner, how far
can he extend this? If the supply is derived from a quarter or
half a mile, or as in the case mentioned, of the Artesian well, can
it be supposed that he intends to claim a right as against landowners so remote?
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Again, can an adjacent landowner in such a case, be presumed
to know that the owner of the well or spring, is deriving the
supply for this from his land, and in that way be held to acquiesce
in the exercise of a right adverse to himself?
In the next place, as every prescription implies a grant where
there is a grantor who parts with something intentionally and
understandingly, and a grantee who, with a like intention and
understanding, accepts what is granted, it is certainly a most
forced presumption of a grant where neither party would have
known, during the period of the pretended acquisition of the
right, that the one was deriving what he was enjoying from the
other.
The first moment that the one party can know that he is using
what he derives from the other, is when the latter, in the exercise
of an unquestioned right of property, excavates within his own
premises for a well, or for minerals, or a quarry, and detects the
source of supply which his neighbor, more or less remote, has
been enjoying. And with what propriety can it then be said, that
the latter has acquired a prescriptive right to the enjoyment, by
its having been continued twenty years adversely to the other
landowner, and with his knowledge and acquiescence?
The nearest analogy, perhaps, to an easement of this kind,
would be that of light, under the English Common Law, and that
of the lateral support of the land of one by that of another. In
respect to the latter, it is rather a simple incident of property
than an easement, and if it is claimed also for the support of a
house on the land, because it was an ancient one, the fact that
the house was there and was acquiring an easement of support,
would be obvious'to the adjacent landowner, as would be the
case in respect to a: house in whose favor a prescription of light
and air should be claimed.
Without pursuing the inquiry any further, the conclusion' seems
to be clear, upon general principles, that the doctrine of prescriptive rights cannot properly be applied to the enjoyment of water
percolating through the earth. And it may be remarked, that
even in the matter of light and air, there are so many objections

